

*From the Editor***Don't Forget Part VI**

Karl Jaspers' monumental *General Psychopathology* first saw the light of day in 1913. Although Jaspers soon left psychiatry for philosophy, he continued to update the text in further editions, ending finally with the seventh edition of 1959, the edition upon which the English translation is based (Trans. J. Hoening and M. Hamilton, Manchester, Manchester U. Press, 1963). In the later editions he brought in recent findings from the field of psychiatry and at times expanded his theoretical discussions, incorporating concepts from his ongoing philosophical research. In the fourth edition of 1942 he undertook a major rewriting of the text and added, for the first time, a Part Six, entitled "The Human Being as a Whole." Jaspers' students have tended to focus on two major, and related, contributions of *General Psychopathology*—the introduction into psychiatry of the phenomenological method and the psychology of meaningful connections (*Verstehende Psychologie*)—and in their emphasis on these contributions have tended to neglect the late-appearing Part Six. In this column I will point to some examples of the focus on phenomenology and understanding (*Verstehen*) and then make a plea for giving more attention to Part Six.

In his *Approaches to the Mind* (1973) Lester Havens focused on Jaspers' study of paranoia from 1910 and emphasized the latter's effort to describe the inner lives of his patients, an effort that would be described in the *General Psychopathology* as phenomenology. In *Psychiatric Polarities* (1987) Phillip Slavney and Paul McHugh emphasized Jaspers' distinction between understanding (*Verstehen*) and explanation (*Erklären*) as the two ways in which we link events genetically, in the first case through connections of meaning and in the second case through causal connections. Two recent publications have continued to describe and explore this dimension of Jaspers' approach to psychopathology. In "Phenomenological and Hermeneutic Models: Understanding and Interpretation in Psychiatry" (in *The Philosophy of Psychiatry: A Companion*, ed Jennifer

President's Column

It seems perverse at this point in our lives to write an open column on any topic that fails to acknowledge at some level what is going on in the Middle East, the U.S., and the rest of the world. AAPP is not a political or an activist organization, nor am I suggesting that it ought to be—there are numerous other outlets for political activism—but like many others, I am so appalled by the philosophy and policies of the Bush government that it is impossible to remain silent. For the second time in my liberal but anti-establishment adult life (AAPP involvement is a first), I have sort-of jumped into the battle, actively supporting ABB (anybody but Bush) with participation at a Minnesota Democratic-Farm-Labor Party caucus, financial contributions, and volunteer campaigning. It seems that fundamentalism of any sort, the certainty that one possesses the only truth worth having, and the intolerance that is its inevitable and fanatical partner, is incompatible with peaceful coexistence either domestically or internationally. Five, ten, fifteen years from now, if the swing to the religious right does not prevail, there may be Truth and Reconciliation conferences examining the events that we are presently experiencing.

To move to what had been the original topic that had caught my intention, the New York Times Magazine (March 21, 2004) carried an article entitled "The Socratic Shrink," describing several fledgling organizations that are promoting and practicing "philosophical counseling." The group of philosophers who initiated this form of counseling have already, within the course of their brief ten years of existence, split into two warring factions, not surprisingly, into conservative and radical elements, similar to the Bolshevik takeover of the more moderate Socialist government and the Freud-Jung split in psychoanalytic circles. The more radical element is, of course, the more attention-getting one, carried along by its charismatic leader Lou Marinoff, a midlife PhD in philosophy (as far as I can glean from the Times article) who has in short order formed his own breakaway organization, the American Philosophical Practitioners Association (APPA), which offers certification in philosophic counseling after a three-day training program to persons holding the PhD in philosophy. The APPA is not to be confused with its anagram, our AAPP. The APPA has its own website, www.appa.edu, which itself is an interesting bit of backroom work, since one would think that the web address would be dot-com or at best dot-org. But dot-edu it is. Marinoff has written two books, *Plato Not Prozac* for the self-help audience and *The Big Questions: How Philosophy Can Change Your Life*. The original organization, from which Marinoff split, is the American Society for Philosophy, Counseling & Psychotherapy, www.aspcp.org, that has its own journal, the *International Journal of Philosophical Practice* (www.ijpp.net). The ASPCP appears to be a more sober and solid organization and less given to the hard sell and hyperbole of the APPA. The ASPCP also appears interested in building links to the traditional psychotherapeutic fields as opposed to pointing out, as does *Plato, Not Prozac*, how philosophical therapy is superior to the usual name brands.

The Times article goes into the character and controversies about Marinoff, since

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Radden, Oxford U Press, 2004), Michael Schwartz and Osborne Wiggins expound Jaspers' basic principles of the understanding of meaningful connections, as developed in the *General Psychopathology*, and they relate this to Husserl's notion of intentionality: "Hence, it is safest to maintain that the subject matter of understanding is intentionality, whether expressed or unexpressed." Finally, Nassir Ghaemi has devoted two chapters of his recently published *The Concepts of Psychiatry: A Pluralistic Approach to the Mind and Mental Illness* (The Johns Hopkins U Press, 2003) to Jaspers. In the first, "Reading Karl Jaspers's *General Psychopathology*," Ghaemi reviews the entire content of the text and devotes a rare few pages to Part Six. Indeed, he states that "Part 6 terminates the text

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this makes at least as interesting reading as what the organization itself is doing, but since it is bad Karma to speak ill of someone's character whom one has not met, I shall here stick to the issues and not the personalities. *Plato, not Prozac* is itself a mixed package, in part shamelessly self-promoting of the sort that takes cheap and tired potshots at some old canards about psychiatrists and psychologists, such as, many psychiatrists and psychologists overlook the point that you can't control an emotion just by recognizing it (p. 41). When not attacking the perceived enemy, *Plato, not Prozac* presents a fairly adequate but pedestrian series of case vignettes in which philosophical counselors bring wisdom to some highly functional individuals who are somewhat stuck at crossroads in their lives. The philosophical wisdom purveyed sounds suspiciously like 1960s and 70s values of self-actualization. Nothing wrong, but nothing new. The interest in philosophers providing psychotherapy, even in our modern era, is not new. In the 1970s, PhDs in philosophy were admitted to some of the non-medical psychoanalytic institutes in New York City, but they were required to go through the vigorous psychoanalytic training program as well as apprentice in a clinical program to get some sense of the full range and severity of human psychopathology.

One group of substantive questions relates to whether philosophers have adequate clinical training and supervised clinical work to engage in therapy, however defined. I have always felt that it is too patently self-serving when professional organizations, as guardians of the Pure, take strong stands against new fields entering into their traditional territory, with the rationale that they are only acting to protect the public from charlatans. This aspect is always somewhat true, but the economic interests are never far behind. After all, the therapy field is already crowded with physicians, psychologists, social workers, nurse practitioners, pastoral counselors and spiritual directors, marital and family counselors, and what not. What's a few extra counselors, more or less? The answer to my first question is that, clearly, the philosophical counselors and therapists do not have adequate clinical experience to work with a range of disturbed patients, and their dissimulation of this by way of attacking a few psychiatric and psychological straw horses is distressing in a group that is professing to understand (and hopefully practice) moral values. Inauthenticity and bad faith, which no one wishes to subscribe to, might be reviewed in this context.

However, the philosophical therapists do raise, indirectly, the issue of what is

therapeutic, if anything, about therapy, and what is required of a therapist to be therapeutic. There are no simple answers to these questions, but it does appear that the non-specifics of therapy, such as the Rogerian virtues of empathy, positive regard, and attentive listening, along with non-exploitation, are more therapeutic than the details of a particular interpretation or approach. But even this is too broad a generalization, as the effectiveness of some forms of focused cognitive-behavioral therapy demonstrate. But if the non-specifics are most important, then why should not philosophers, at least those who are capable of empathy and warmth, combine these features with a philosophical perspective and be as therapeutic as practitioners in psychiatry and psychology? My own take on this is that if the 'client' is healthy and wants to discuss values and purposes and strategies in life, philosophical therapists will do as well as the rest of us. When it comes to mental illnesses, when there are underlying causes, either biological or experiential, of the condition beside fuzzy thinking, and when serious characterological problems are present, then we really want someone with clinical experience and with a knowledge of human development as well as a knowledge of psychological and therapeutic process. We also want, to some extent, the virtues of humility and intellectual honesty.

It is interesting that psychiatry and psychology are themselves moving toward an awareness of the importance of philosophy as a foundation to research and practice. The writings of Bill Fulford and John Sadler on values are but one example. My own group in Minnesota has been investigating the role of moral worry and the moral emotions in patients (and others). There is a thoughtful book on looking at moral issues in mental health treatment by John Peteet (a psychiatrist) titled *Doing the Right Thing* and published by the American Psychiatric Press (2004). For a good example of where psychology is heading, I would recommend the writings of Martin Seligman either on his own website (www.upenn.edu/seligman) or his essay *Eudaemonia, The Good Life* on www.edge.org. There seems to be much evidence of the convergence of our fields as our own AAPP and journal PPP so eloquently attest. Given the fact that there are more PhD philosophers than academic jobs, philosophical counseling in one form or another is probably here to stay, and possibly flourish. Much depends initially on how they present themselves, but in the long run on how seriously they take the need for

clinical preparation and training.

Jerome Kroll, M.D.

Essay/Review

Return to Reason, Stephen Toulmin. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 2001.

Return to Reason (1), Stephen Toulmin's latest book, represents what is perhaps the culmination of a career that has been dedicated to resurrecting practical reason from the throes of modernity. The book's principal claim is that the unremitting quest for universal knowledge is part and parcel of a tradition that has thrown reason out of balance, and the resulting situation has become intolerable. In working out the implications of this claim, Toulmin gives a synoptic account of the rise and eventual (if not actual) fall of rationalism. The alternative he sketches gives us a glimpse into one possible version of the post-modern era.

Toulmin's previous works speak extensively about medical and psychiatric practice, and *Return to Reason* is no exception. This proclivity alone makes his ideas worth examining, especially for those who are following or contributing to the rapidly evolving relationship between philosophy and psychiatry. My task in this review is to highlight some of the issues that Toulmin raises and draw out their historical context, give a brief survey of the book, and persuade the reader that despite a few notable flaws, *Return to Reason* is a significant contribution to philosophy of science.

For Toulmin, disciplinary encampment is a legacy of the modern age. It is symptom of how progress and problem have become intertwined. By insinuating itself into the discussion of *who* should be speaking about these matters and *how* they should be addressed, encampment also poses an impediment to our finding a way out. The impediment is felt most acutely, perhaps, when one discipline claims a foundational relationship to another. It is one thing for a person to be a philosopher and also, for instance, an artist or physician. But when the philosopher contributes to the literature of psychopathology, medical ethics, and the nature of scientific investigation, or when scientists invoke philosophical concepts in discussing etiology, nosology, treatment, and public policy, there are inclinations to conflate and overreach.

That there are difficulties of even speaking about a "philosophy of science" in a way that is true to both philosophy and science is evident from the uproar that fol-

lowed the publication Kuhn's *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (2). This work was intended as volumes 1 and 2 of the International Encyclopedia of Unified Science. Gauging by the names on the Encyclopedia's editorial committee—names that include Carnap, Morris, and Neurath—it appears that Kuhn's monograph was expected to bear the imprimatur of logical positivism. If so, the book is a modern-day Trojan Horse, a radical alternative that shook positivism to the core by its epochal account of scientific progress. Like it or not, the work has affected, perhaps dominated, the discourse in philosophy of science since early drafts began circulating in the late 1950s.

There seem to have been two waves of reaction to Kuhn's *Structure*. First came the immediate and detailed critiques of luminaries such as Lakatos, Popper, Toulmin, Feyerabend, and others. Some of these appear in the edited volume, *Criticism and the Growth of Growth of Knowledge* (3). A second wave of interest has begun recently, and I recall a brief review that cast new light on the controversy. I had been following the plethora of accounts, raves, and dismissals; like everyone else, I had heard about all sorts of ostensible and prospective paradigm shifts and been treated to fantastical depictions of shifts that seemed to be taking place under our noses. By now, I was convinced that terms such as "normal science," "paradigms," and "incommensurability" had become almost protean, and the prospect of moving the discussion forward was becoming almost pointless. But this was a different kind of commentary. It was written by a scientist, who said, in effect: "I've read the book and tried to understand it. I think I know what Kuhn is getting at. But I don't see anything that resembles what I do."

Given the specialization of disciplines, scientists need not concern themselves with the relationship between science and philosophy. Nor should we expect philosophers of science to be competent scientists. But, this reviewer makes a rather disarming point in asking how a monograph about science that is so abstracted from the life and activities of scientists can warrant the acclaim it has received? Indeed, what gives a philosopher the mandate to speak so abstractly about science? And vice-versa: How do we gauge the worth of a scientist's speaking about philosophy? Perhaps science and philosophy of science have become so distinct that a bridge between them is bound to connect nothing and lead nowhere. To draw on a Wittgensteinian metaphor, philosophy of science may be rather like a doorknob that doesn't turn.

Return to Reason takes a run at these questions, partly because Toulmin believes that Kuhn was on the right track, if only his

historical narrative had not come up short. Toulmin fills in the gap that was not touched by *Structure* and the critical commentaries. We get the impression that this philosopher knows how science is practiced. When he speaks about medicine, we recognize that he actually knows what he is talking about. However, Toulmin has another purpose in mind: He is taking dead aim at the tradition that, among its other foibles, has created the mess that Kuhn, Feyerabend, and their associates have been trying to clean up. This is the tradition of rationalism, that began roughly with Descartes, continues to the present day, and over the past three hundred years or so, has become an hegemony.

In Toulmin's view, rationalism is perhaps the defining character of the modern age. Hence, if the difficulties of the modernity are to be surmounted, rationalism must yield. If we are to restore reason to a legitimate place in public discourse, we must rid ourselves of rationalistic impulse to predicate action on putative certainty and universal knowledge. If medicine is to survive the specter of managed care, it will be because the skills of clinical practice are elevated above the algorithms, critical pathways, and assorted trappings of rationalistic thinking.

Toulmin's critique of modernity may be placing too much at the doorstep of rationalism; in so doing, he may have created something like a fish-eye perspective. I think his work is vulnerable to this criticism, but allow me to sketch the argument before the aspersions have been cast. The source material is not *Return to Reason*, but its predecessor, *Cosmopolis* (4), which offers a general critique of modernity. Toulmin challenges the commonly accepted view that the modern age is a time of great progress, in stark contrast to the repressive, culturally and intellectually bereft, period that preceded it. That view paints a rosy picture of the renaissance and fails to account for the immediate precedent, the "high middle ages," in which practical Aristotelianism co-existed with theoretical Platonism.

According to Toulmin, modernity was influenced by two preliminary phases: there was a period of humanism, whose heyday was around the middle of the sixteenth century. A hundred years later, a backlash that Toulmin derides as the "17th century counter-renaissance" had scorned practicality and championed abstraction and universality. He identifies four principal movements of the backlash: 1. from oral to written, 2. from particular to universal, 3. from local to general, and 4. from timely to timeless. The most effi-

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The association for the Advancement of Philosophy and Psychiatry (AAPP) is requesting abstracts for papers to be presented at the 2005 Annual Meeting, May 21 and 22, 2005, in conjunction with the American Psychiatric Association meeting in Atlanta, Georgia. Papers may emphasize any aspect of the theme of Technology and Psychiatry, including the effects of technological advances, the implications of technical/instrumental thinking, and the psychiatric consequences of a technologically driven culture.

Abstracts of 600 words or less must be submitted in triplicate to: James Phillips, M.D., 88 Noble Avenue, Milford, CT 06460. Submission must be postmarked by November 1, 2004. Abstracts will be refereed by members of the AAPP Executive Council and their designees, and acceptances will be mailed no later than January 15, 2005. Authors with accepted abstracts will read their papers at the 2005 Annual Meeting. Accepted papers will be presented within a strict 30-minute time limit.

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cient way to describe these four is to cite *Cosmopolis* directly:

1. The research program of modern philosophy thus set aside all questions about *argumentation*—among particular people in specific situations, dealing with concrete cases, where varied things were at stake—in favor of *proofs* that could be set down in writing, and judged as written” (p. 31).

2. The middle ages followed procedures that Aristotle recommended in the *Nichomachean Ethics*, in which sound moral judgment respects the detailed circumstances that are specific to individual cases and situations. But this standard had changed by the mid-seventeenth century: “Casuistry [case-based reasoning] met the same comprehensive scorn from moral philosophers as rhetoric did from the logicians. In a phrase, *general principles were in, particular cases were out*” (p. 32).

3. It was Descartes who “taught that philosophical understanding never comes from accumulating experience of particular individuals and specific cases. The demands of rationality impose on philosophy a need to seek out abstract, general ideas and principles, by which particulars can be connected together” (p. 33).

4. All projects for a universal natural philosophy struck the [sixteenth century] humanists as problematic. A hundred years later, the shoe was on the other foot. For Descartes and his successors, timely questions were no concern of philosophy: instead, their aim was to bring to light permanent structure underlying all the changeable phenomena of Nature” (p. 34). Almost three centuries later, Dewey (5) referred to the utter turnabout from practical to conceptual, concrete to abstract, particular to universal, and timely to timeless as “the quest for certainty,” and dedicated himself to dismantling it. Dewey’s effort was followed by his student Richard Rorty (6), who contrasted systems of thinking that are designed to function as mirrors of nature with the sheer openness and wonder of unpredictability and originality.

Rorty’s philosophical heroes, besides Dewey, were Heidegger and Wittgenstein. Rorty saw these three as great thinkers who turned away from their own previously successful efforts at system building to challenge themselves and their discipline to create, in effect, a mirror-less philosophy. Heidegger’s name is barely mentioned by Toulmin. However, Wittgenstein, who ap-

pears on both Rorty’s and Toulmin’s lists, was one of Toulmin’s mentors; in *Return to Reason*, he refers to his *Cosmopolis* as a Wittgensteinian critique of modernity.

It is clear from Wittgenstein’s treatment of subjects such as certainty, private sensation, and extensive discussions about psychology, that some of his thinking fits comfortably within the purview of philosophy of science. However, Wittgenstein would reject wholly any claim that he was such as philosopher (or even that such a specialty ought to exist). In *Return to Reason*, Toulmin lets us in on his uneasiness about Wittgenstein, and suggests some fairly personal insights that have not appeared elsewhere. Nonetheless, it is not stretching a point too far to suggest that, for Rorty there was Dewey, for Toulmin there was Wittgenstein, and each protégé has advanced ideas that originated with his respective mentors. Hence, it is useful to look at Toulmin’s immediate influences, in increasing importance, as Kuhn, then Rorty and Dewey, and with Wittgenstein and Collingwood at the top. (The latter was Toulmin’s other principal mentor. He is acknowledged respectfully in *Return to Reason*, but his work is discussed only briefly.) I will suggest later why the development of Wittgenstein’s philosophy may comprise Toulmin’s most significant contribution to current thinking.

Other influences are more temporally distant, but Toulmin makes clear that they play a critical role in *Return to Reason*. The names Aristotle and Michel de Montaigne are at the top of this list. The latter is relatively unknown, especially in philosophical circles (and his demotion from the rank of Real Philosopher is an important piece of the story). Aristotle is another matter. If we were to consult all of Toulmin’s works that touch on the subjects of practicality and reason, including *The Abuse of Casuistry* (with Albert Jonsen, 7), and *Beyond Theory* (with Bjørn Gustavsen, 8) as well as *Cosmopolis* and *Return to Reason*, we would conclude that Aristotle is portrayed as the thinker who got it right. The “it” refers to preferences for *phronesis* (practical reason) over *episteme* (theoretical grasp) and *techne* (technical mastery), for rhetoric over formal logic, and for casuistry over abstraction and the pursuit of universality.

Nowhere is Toulmin’s reliance on Aristotle more evident than in the chapter in *Return to Reason* entitled “Practical Reason and the Clinical Arts.” This chapter relates philosophy and science to medical practice, and psychiatry is explored at several points. The discussion of clinical practice begins with the Aristote-

lian distinction between the syllogism and the enthymeme. The former is an abstract logical structure that can be judged as valid or invalid. The latter is a concrete practical argument that is advanced for the purpose of persuasion. (For further discussion about the relationship between syllogism and enthymeme, see Bryant (9), Brockreide (10), and Hample (11).) Syllogistic reasoning might run as follows: all good bridges support at least fifteen tons; this is a good bridge; therefore, it supports at least fifteen tons. By contrast, an enthymeme begins not with a major premise, but with a specific situation. For instance: The town council is deliberating over whether to build a new bridge over the river that flows through the middle of town. The old bridge collapsed because it could not bear the weight of three trucks, each weighing about five tons. The question is, should such a bridge be able to carry three trucks, more than three, or should an ordinance be passed that prohibits more than two trucks from being on the bridge at the same time? The cost of the bridge is directly related to its strength, and its ability to bear weight is gauged by the best available knowledge. Owing to a variety of factors for which there are insufficient data (such as current, wind, and vibration), the weight-bearing capacity of a bridge can only be estimated. The argument I want to make to the council is that we should replace the fallen bridge with another fifteen ton structure. I believe this is the most cost-effective solution, given our current needs and the size of our treasury. Should this bridge prove insufficient, we can build a second bridge at a later date. Formally, my argument runs as follows: We need a bridge and can afford one that meets our current needs; we cannot project future needs or revenues adequately; therefore, we should build to meet our current needs and make subsequent decisions as future needs and interests arise.

By syllogistic standards, my argument is hopelessly invalid: There are too many terms, an undistributed middle, and a conclusion generated from particular premises. However, the syllogism presumes knowledge that is clearly lacking or is deficient, and it does not address the policy question of how much money should be spent on this particular project. We have a choice, then, between a form of argument that is irrelevant and impractical, but tidy and precise, and another that is relevant and practical, but rather sloppy, indefinite, and with time-limited value.

What Toulmin argues comes down to this: In matters of clinical practice (as well as social policy), relevance, practicality, and timeliness are the trump qualities. But rationalistic thinking sets these qualities aside in favor of tidiness, precision, and

universality. In the rationalistic tradition, the tail wags the dog, because qualities of judgment that are assumed to have pre-eminent intrinsic value therefore have primacy over qualities that inhere to the situation at hand.

Clinical practice is a paradigmatic case of Aristotelian reasoning supervening the rationality of Plato and Descartes, so long as extant needs, demands of the situation, limitations of knowledge, and timeliness are duly appreciated. According to Toulmin:

One of the things that made Aristotle a perceptive commentator on the demands of practical reason, of course, is his background of having grown up in a medical family. The fact that he himself worked as a physician and was the son of a physician enhanced his understanding of *timeliness*, not just in Medicine but in Ethics and practical fields of all kinds (1, p. 109).

Of all the medical specialties, psychiatry has been perhaps slowest to endorse practical reasoning, and Toulmin attributes this curiosity to psychiatry's struggle for legitimacy as a biomedical science. Even Erik Erikson seems all too eager to distinguish psychiatric practice from natural science, and endorse the notion that the indefiniteness inherent to clinical work militates against psychiatry's "scientific validity" (cited in 1, p. 110). One question that bears asking is, "why should psychiatry be singled out instead of dermatology, for instance?" Toulmin proposes a different question that may lead psychiatry to a more secure position: Should we not be developing a new science of practice and pit this science against the rationalist-inspired model that champions scientific validity? Toulmin is not proposing a paradigm shift, in which the losing science goes to the dust bin. Nor is he thinking like Rorty's *edifier* and proposing something that would reside on the scientific periphery. Rather, he seems to suggest that a science of practice would be valuable enough to compete with natural science head-to-head.

My belief is that a science of practice would rely on well-developed, sophisticated, theories. Since the rationalistic tradition eschews theory in favor of method, announcing a parallel science at this time is premature. However, we should begin developing it as quickly as possible. Elaborating fully on this answer would move the discussion far afield. But *Return to Reason* contains a few building blocks that deserve mention. First, one of the apparently definitive arguments against a science of practice is that the best it can give is an endless permutation of disconnected events, and clinical practice dearly needs to be informed by general truths and knowledge. Toulmin deals with this critical issue directly and

cogently by exploring the distinction between generality and universality. The former is synonymous with the ancient Greek word for "universal." But this word roughly means *generally*, as in the expression "on the whole." Something may be *generally* the case without any requirement or implication that it be so *invariably*. A science of practice seeks, develops, and utilizes general knowledge.

Inquiring into specifics that may (or may not) be *generally* the case requires an assessment of the situation before us, whereas situation, event, and context are at best tertiary when the inquiry seeks universal truth or immutable knowledge. To put the difference in a more technical way for statistically-minded readers, generality leaves room for error, which may be owing to unreliability of measurement and other unexplained sources of variance. What we are calling "the situation" is an explainable source of variance that can (and should) be accounted for. In traditional scientific investigation, which is rationalism par excellence, "the situation" is an unexplained source of variance, and hence a contaminating influence.

The prospect of dealing with the situation becomes even more dicey when human *values* come to the fore. As Toulmin points out, in the human sciences we are trained "to confine ourselves to 'facts' and steer clear of 'values' because these (it is said) may introduce a damaging bias into our inquiries. In the Academy, human scientists as much as natural scientists are expected to treat the contrast between facts and values not just as a distinction, but as a downright separation" (1, p. 45).

Curiously, traditional scientists investigate values and incorporate them into their work ad lib., provided that these values are hypothesized to be properties of the phenomena they are investigating. For instance, values have been studied extensively by social psychology since the 1930s, and they play a significant role in theories developed by Fishbein, Rokeach, and others. Values are integral to behavioral theories of meaning; they are the subject of countless studies in experimental psychology, including studies of human judgment. Values play a significant role in current sociological theories, including theories of social capital. Fulford (12, 13) reminds us that in psychiatry, DSM-IV requires an assessment of values in order to make a diagnosis of schizophrenia. Since explorations of values are patently routine, why should practitioners of the human sciences expect their disciplines to be value-free?

Before we get to Toulmin's answer,

let us dispose of a canard. The dictum, "science is value-free," has taken on a life of its own either as a first principle or a paradigmatic illustration of the superficiality of scientific dogma. The question of what was meant by it first was uttered seems to have been lost in the shuffle. Fuller's polemic against Kuhn (14) treats the issue extensively and comes up with the following: It was Max Weber, in a 1918 address to graduate students at the University of Munich, who issued the call for a "value-free" science. The call was an injunction against educators who had come to regard their own values as empirical truths, and were expecting their students to take on these values and endorse them uncritically.

Whoever observed that the call for a value-free science is itself a value assertion is quite correct, but not because of an internal contradiction in the assertion (which is the usual purpose of making the observation). Weber was calling for ideological self-restraint. If there is a contradiction worth noting, it lies in the tendency to use the statement as a hammer, precisely for the purpose of passing values onto the next generation. Recently, I had the occasion to witness an egregious instance, in which it was used as a litmus test by a professor who insists that "science is about power" and its products should therefore be taken with a grain of salt.

Toulmin's claim is that science is about values because scientific *practice* cannot be devoid of values. Internal medicine easily draws a distinction between a well-functioning heart and a malfunctioning one, and Toulmin retorts that if this is not a value difference, it is hard to say what is! (p. 106). He continues: "From this point on, then, human scientists need no longer hesitate to study the difference between *well-functioning* and *malfunctioning* societies or cultures, organizations or personalities. This is just what the rest of the world can legitimately ask us to do" (pp. 106-7).

His argument runs at cross-purposes with the scientifically-grounded quest for universal knowledge when it comes to the distinction between scientific *practice* and *method*. The chapter in *Return to Reason* entitled "Rethinking Method" explores this distinction. It draws heavily on two sources: Feyerabend's work, *Against Method* (15), and Wittgenstein's treatment of rule-following. The application of Feyerabend is too brief, but it is handled deftly. However, the reference to grammatical rules is problematic.

I want to discuss the problem at some length, beginning with a usual qualifier: Wittgenstein's apparently ordinary and colloquial concepts are notoriously difficult to discuss briefly, and explanations that attempt to be clear and concise are often

times more beguiling than anything else. However, it is difficult to appreciate what is involved in the simple-sounding phrase, “following a rule,” without becoming arcane. Indubitably, rule-following plays a prominent role in Wittgenstein’s conception of philosophy as an activity whose purpose, first and foremost, is to clarify and dissipate philosophical problems. Rule-following is deeply implicated in Toulmin’s critique of method, or more precisely, of his advocating a philosophy that is comprised not of one method, but many (16, §§109, 133).

The problem to which I have alluded becomes evident in book’s penultimate chapter, entitled “The World of Where and When.” In some respects, this is the most important chapter of the book, but also the most troubling. Toulmin proposes that Wittgenstein’s philosophy can be traced to the skepticism of Montaigne, and ultimately to Sextus Empiricus. This lineage is suggested early in *Return to Reason*, but it comes fully to light in this later chapter, which begins with the statement: “Pragmatism and skepticism are the beginning of a wisdom that is better than the dreams of the rationalists” (p. 190). There is no doubt that skepticism plays a significant role in Toulmin’s analysis of the problem and in the solution he outlines. Even the strategy that is at work in this chapter has a skeptical flavor: it begins by detaching practical knowledge from scientific inquiry and identifies a precedent in the work of the sixteenth century skeptical thinker, Michel de Montaigne. Toulmin then links the skepticism of the high middle ages with two twentieth century writers, Wittgenstein and Virginia Woolf. Wittgenstein is depicted as a contemporary Pyrrhonist, in the mold of Sextus Empiricus.

The classical skepticism to which Wittgenstein putatively adheres refuses either to endorse or deny any knowledge claim that is too comprehensive or grandiose to fall within the scope of human experience (p. 195). Toulmin argues that classical skepticism fits nicely with Montaigne, but has no traffic with the skeptical arguments of Descartes and Hume. Hence, the seventeenth century counter-renaissance, precipitated by Descartes’ denunciation of Montaigne, was founded on one form of skepticism superseding another. The ultimate success of Descartes’ position spelled the end for practical thinking, while it relegated rhetoric and casuistry to the tertiary, barely legitimate, positions that they hold even today in the halls of academe.

The linkage from Sextus Empiricus to Michel de Montaigne to Ludwig Wittgenstein completes Toulmin’s argument. The balance of reason has been upset; this balance was maintained, in part, by classical skepticism. Once the skeptical approach of Montaigne yielded, the unrelenting quest

for universal, timeless, and abstract knowledge came to resemble a runaway train. This quest, which goes by the name of “rationalism,” grants legitimacy to skepticism, but only as a means of identifying and overcoming sundry impediments to the pursuit of certainty.

For Toulmin, the task at hand is to extract ourselves from the rationalist quagmire, then develop a new approach that, as it were, keeps the tractor out of the ditch. Fulfilling this task requires a skeptical strategy with roots in antiquity that was active in the high middle ages, but became dormant until it was resurrected by Dewey in the early twentieth century. In the philosophy of Wittgenstein, classical skepticism resumes the position from which it was banished; he, along with Virginia Woolf, are exemplars of contemporary anti-rationalist thought.

It is the link to skepticism, and particularly to the claim that Wittgenstein is a skeptic, that puts Toulmin’s argument on precarious ground. Wittgenstein’s own remarks offer scant support for such a claim, and the sheer amount of counter-evidence should give Toulmin pause. Note these remarks from the *Tractatus* (17):

6.5. When the answer cannot be put into words, neither can the question be put into words. The riddle does not exist. If a question can be framed at all, it is also possible to answer it.

6.51. Scepticism is not irrefutable, but obviously nonsensical, when it tries to raise doubts where no questions can be asked. For doubt can exist only where a question exists, a question only where an answer exists, and an answer only where something can be said.

The preceding text first appears in a 1914 notebook. Over thirty years later, long after his celebrated “turn” from formal to ordinary language, Wittgenstein wrote the following remarks, which appear in *On Certainty* (18):

114. If you are not certain of any fact, you cannot be certain of the meaning of your words either.

115. If you tried to doubt everything you would not get as far as doubting anything. The game of doubting itself presupposes certainty.

There is continuity on matters of language, doubt, and certainty that transcends the breach between Wittgenstein’s “early” and “late” philosophies. Doubt is portrayed as integral to the play of language; skepticism is dismissed as nonsense; doubt and certainty belong together. Toulmin explains the paucity of

direct evidence away by raising Wittgenstein’s well-known indifference to philosophical history and his deficient “historical attitude” (*Return to Reason*, p. 201). Toulmin appears to be pressing his claim, *pace* Wittgenstein, and over his express objections.

This is a bad move for three reasons: It gives an incorrect view of Wittgenstein, promotes a serious misinterpretation of where Toulmin’s argument is heading, and weakens his principal claim. Toulmin is not the first scholar who has discussed Wittgenstein’s putative skepticism. The most fully-developed treatment is probably contained in Saul Kripke’s (19) exposition of Wittgenstein’s famous private language argument. In Kripke’s (or as some are inclined to say, “Kripkenstein’s”) view, a skeptical paradox poses the central problem of the *Philosophical Investigations*. This problem advances a novel form of philosophical skepticism that Kripke likens to Berkeley and Hume, but regards “as the most radical and original skeptical problem that philosophy has seen to date” (p. 61).

As I interpret it, Wittgenstein’s view is that language practice is rule-based. Rules are a motley of conventions—“a complicated network of similarities overlapping and crisscrossing: sometimes overall similarities, sometimes similarities of detail” (*Investigations*, §66). Rules are, simultaneously, conventions of meaning and of usage (see §§43, 371-3). The regularities that comprise language practice are *internal* to the structure of language. Though lacking a canonical or constant form, it is precisely this structure (which Wittgenstein sometimes refers to as “grammar”) that comprises the logic of language. As Wittgenstein explains:

If language is to be a means of communication there must be agreement not only in definitions but also (queer as this may sound) in judgments. This seems to abolish logic, but does not do so.—It is one thing to describe methods of measurement, and another to obtain and state results of measurement. But what we call “measuring” is partly determined by a certain constancy in results of measurement (§242).

Wittgenstein devoted his later career to describing this multifarious logic. In Kenneck’s (20) words, Wittgenstein is best understood as a “descriptive grammarian.”

Contrast my view with Kripke’s, in which Wittgenstein acknowledges the importance of rules in language, then proceeds to argue that these rules cannot be followed privately. This is the Kripkensteinian argument against the possibility of a private language. It leads to the claim that since rule-following is a necessary characteristic

of language practice, language and meaning must be practiced according to community standards. Thus, our language (that is, the rules of usage) depend “on agreement, and on checkability—on one person’s ability to test whether another uses a term as he does” (Kripke, p. 99).

Kripke’s monograph, published in 1982, renewed the interest of philosophers in Wittgenstein’s private language argument, which in turn led to a fresh examination of what Wittgenstein meant by stylized terms such as “rules” and “grammar.” The arguments that were brought to bear against Kripke’s position, particularly by Baker and Hacker (21) and Malcolm (22), focused on Kripke’s misconstruing where in the *Investigations* the argument actually appears, what Wittgenstein means by the term “private language,” and why he makes the argument in the first place. If by *privately*, we mean: “by oneself, without the assistance or involvement of anyone else,” then Wittgenstein does not claim that persons lack the ability to follow rules of language privately. Rather, a private language is a set of rules that can be known to one person only. The rules of a private language cannot be shared (*Investigations*, §243). Technically, the private language argument is directed against the possibility of private ostensive definition, which is a presupposition or implication of Frege’s modern logic and Russell’s logical system.

The so-called solution to this illusory problem complicates matters further and promotes a serious misinterpretation of Toulmin’s analysis and proposal. Kripke’s skeptical solution announces what is known as the “community view”—the notion that meanings are established and arbitrated by social consensus. Even if the business about a skeptical paradox were dismissed or forgotten, the conclusion that persists is that, skeptical or otherwise, *Philosophical Investigations* is a manifesto of constructivism. By using a skeptical account of Wittgenstein’s philosophy to support an argument against the pursuit of immutable knowledge and in favor of an alternative science, Toulmin is feeding the view that runs roughly as follows. Kuhn did what a number of philosophers had done long before him: he demonstrated that there is no such thing as “objective truth.” The meanings of words such as “truth,” “knowledge,” and the like are determined by a paradigm, and scientific paradigms are another of Wittgenstein’s language games. All language—including the words we are using now—are conventions, whose meanings are products of social consensus. We need a “science” (use that word if you like, so long as we have agreed on its meaning) that regards itself and what it studies as socially constructed. *Return to Reason* is following

a growing line of post-modern thought.

Witness the battle lines forming. First, Baker and Hacker’s (21) observation bears mention, that if the skeptical problem were real, the “community view” poses no viable solution. If we cannot follow a rule by our own devices, how are we supposed to follow rules that are established by a community? To use one of Kripke’s examples, when I say that $2 + 2 = 4$, I cannot know whether I am doing addition or “quaddition.” The community is supposed to instruct me to do the former, so $2 + 2 = 4$ and $4 + 2 = 6$. If the symbol “+” were *quus*, then $4 + 2 = 8$ because the rule of *quaddition* is that 2 is added to each successive calculation. If I cannot keep straight that “+” in this instance means plus and not *quus*, then how am I supposed to understand what the “community” (whatever that is) is telling me in the first place, much less to follow community standards with requisite consistency?

Whether it is under the guise of skepticism or constructivism, a view that posits a mediator (such as the community) that comes between language and meaning is unprepared to account for the internal structure—the grammar, if you will—that Wittgenstein has painstakingly described. To put it another way, language has “internals” such that the meaning of a word can be given by explaining its meaning. Word, meaning, and explanation are deeply and directly interrelated. No outside referent—no symbol, representation, or anything else—is invoked. Wittgenstein is enjoining us to watch and listen to people’s use of language, and observe practices that are arbitrary, self-contained, and have no necessary relationship with reality. A claim can be made, I suppose, that refusing to endorse or dispute any concept of reality makes one a skeptic. Likewise, it may be reasonable to suggest that someone who construes language as not referential but conventional might make them a constructivist. Given time, I could show how Wittgenstein could also be depicted as a behaviorist, empiricist, and (yes!) a rationalist. But all of these labels cause us to forget that his task—and as he saw it, the task of philosophy—is to describe the workings of language.

A problem with Wittgenstein’s work is that he has left us with a seemingly endless permutation of individual cases and intimations of manifold practices that are devoid of *generality*. Wittgenstein’s practical philosophy is remarkably intransigent—it is enigmatic, difficult to talk about, and exhausting to practice! Toulmin has taken on the formidable task of surmounting this problem while remain-

ing relatively faithful to Wittgenstein’s purpose. This task began with Toulmin’s first major work, *The Uses of Argument* (23), and culminates in *Return to Reason*. With the allusions to skepticism redacted, the value and distinctiveness of this work and its contribution to philosophy of science becomes apparent.

And so does its relevance to the practice of medicine, particularly psychiatry. We who lived in the twentieth century witnessed a series of astonishing developments in psychiatric practice. Pioneering efforts that were directed at classifying the disorder now known as schizophrenia have become naïve, almost embarrassing, by current standards. Thankfully, treatments are nothing like they used to be, and persons who once were relegated to back wards are now living in their communities. But at the beginning of the twenty-first century, we are trying to make do with a nosology that is mystifying and unwieldy; we are under the specter of managed care; mental illness is as stigmatizing as ever, and there is a raft of unfulfilled promises about the discovery of pathogenic agents and processes. Signs of progress can be inventoried ad infinitum, and so can the indications of quiescence. We are left with every reason to stay the course, to be frustrated, to call for dramatic change, and to observe that the paradigm is shifting. In the meantime, there is a person in front of us needs expert attention.

The efforts of descriptive psychiatry have been directed largely at greater pursuits, such as discovering the cause and cure of schizophrenia. All the while, psychiatric practice has been more about the person in front us. A disjunction between purpose and objective on the one hand and actual practice on the other is evident every day, on every unit or service, in every clinic and office. The task of practitioners is to prevent the clash from devolving into a Hobson’s choice: they can endorse Kraepelin’s lore and wisdom, but not his belief about a progressive course. They will rely on the latest atypicals, but resist the urge to use them as maintenance. We pore over the literature to learn about the optimal adjuncts to medication therapy, but remain wary of findings from studies that are sloppy or artificial.

Along with administrators, patients, family members, policy makers, and other stakeholders, practitioners are positioned in the breach, where we arbitrate between the scientific trajectory and the facts at hand. Philosophy of science has taken on the big issues and offered little or no guidance about practical matters. I suspect that the reviewer who did not recognize what he does in Kuhn’s accounts of normal and revolutionary science is speaking for many of us, and his commentary applies to ration-

alistic-inspired treatments as well as narrative accounts. We need an alternative grounded in practice that encourages us to utilize extant knowledge without imposing a belief system that dulls our acuity.

Wittgenstein offers such an alternative, but it is a fragmentary prelude. We are reminded that the rules of language tend to dazzle our understanding and hold us captive; we are chided with injunctions such as “don’t think, but look!” It is Toulmin who molds these fragments into a coherent perspective, and in so doing, moves philosophy of science away from its lofty preoccupations and toward a prospective science of the *meantime*. This is not a warmed-over Ram Das nor an effort to resurrect the case for contingent knowledge. The person in front of us is compelling our attention. Our response may not be grounded, but it must be competent. To quote the title of Return to Reason’s final chapter, we are “Living with Uncertainty.” As Toulmin’s critique indicates why we are in this position, his alternative demonstrates that with good reason, we can do so effectively.

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The Neurohermeneutic Forum

Post-Psychological America

Americans in the nineteen-fifties, sixties, and seventies spent a lot of time examining their own psyches, both individually and collectively. In private consulting rooms across the nation, American self-seekers labored with psychoanalysts and other therapists to unearth their own hidden motives and thus to refine their very senses of self. Meanwhile, through print and other public media, American social critics questioned limits on self-definition imposed by the doctrinaire patriotism. American self-rumination became so ubiquitous that the commentator Christopher Lasch coined a convincing name for the phenomenon in the title

of his well-known book, *The Culture of Narcissism*.

Yet now, at the outset of the twenty-first century, self-examination in America is in headlong and disastrous retreat. A series of historical transformations, some gradual and others traumatically abrupt, have thrown constructive self-scrutiny into disrepute. Developments in brain science have moved psychotherapy patients off the analyst’s couch and into the drug store for a quick fix without extended self-reflection. AIDS has let loose a now ongoing moral backlash against exploratory sex outside the marital confines of traditional nuclear families. An explosion in business computer and telecommunications technology has undercut public resistance to the hegemony of corporate networks in the media and the marketplace. The decline of socialism has sucked the life from secular idealism, leaving a vacuum increasingly filled by unreflective religious dogma. And 9/11, of course, has fueled a shrill new national indulgence in visceral, thoughtless forms of “patriotism.”

Most of these developments entail conservative retrenchment; right-wing talk-show hosts, columnists, and politicians have managed to sell many twenty-first century Americans on a myopically unreflective version of the self lacking any real psychological depth. The new reactionary “self” is a mere cartoon, drawn from formulaic caricatures of a well-behaved consumer, spouse, parent, churchgoer, and patriot. There is no multi-layered complexity hidden within the motivational structure of this model citizen; he is a paragon of superficial self-transparency, assumed to possess immediate conscious access to all his own motivations. Hence he is both able and obliged to regulate his own civic behavior according to the simplistic standards of some idealized (and largely fictitious) yesterday.

Advocates of such views have tried to silence opposition by tarring critics with the stain of “moral relativism.” In fact, post-modern remnants of the political left have been unable to fend off this allegation because it contains an unfortunate kernel of truth. Trendy postmodernists, by glibly “deconstructing” the very concept of self, have removed any trace of a possible subject on which to anchor moral self-scrutiny. The only ideologically well-defined camp still possessing a rhetorical, albeit grossly distorted, self-matrix that can help to gauge American moral standards is the conservative right.

The critical left, before embarking in earnest upon deconstruction in the nineteen-eighties, had offered a potent alternative to right-wing definitions of the authentic American self. That alternative, called her-

menetics, allowed true self-exploration because its subject was a richly multi-layered citizen of the *Lebenswelt*, rather than the skin-deep consumer-patriot of the right or the completely deconstructed non-self of postmodernity. Critical self-reflection thus held out the potential of exposing deep problematic motivations, meanings, and implications not clearly visible on the surface of American psychological, economic, and spiritual life. Psychoanalysis was empowered to plumb unconscious and often unsavory aspects of “normal” family relations; meta-economics was able to examine the occult “hieroglyphic” symbolism of the advertised commodity; existential theology could root out origins of bad faith in conventionalized religious institutions.

We need to marshal the hermeneutic tools of critical self-reflections once again in America. The post-psychological mindset of the second Bush era at the start of the new millennium has served our country poorly. Under Bush II we have thoughtlessly left behind a nation that once strove to care for its poor, uphold civil liberties, separate church from state, and maintain international good will. We have hardly even asked ourselves *why* we so passively allowed our national leadership to herd us in this dark new direction.

A reawakening of interest in psychological self-scrutiny by Americans might well throw more light on that vexing question. Signs of organized feistiness among political elements opposed to the greatest excesses of the radical right raise the hope that some form of constructive self-reflection may yet reenter the American mind-set. However, mere politics is not depth psychology, and political opposition does not necessarily breed true critical self-awareness by the body politic. The jury is still out on the ability of the United States to regain that kind of inner national strength.

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(Continued from page 1, Editor's Column)

of the book and is probably the most read segment, along with the introduction.” In the second of the Jaspers chapters, “What is Scientific Method in Psychiatry?” Ghaemi elaborates on what he considers Jaspers’ major (and related) contributions to psychiatry: methodological pluralism and the understanding-explanation dichotomy.

Ghaemi’s optimistic appraisal of the reception of Part Six notwithstanding, it is my impression that, as the above citations suggest, the attention of students of the *General Psychopathology* has remained focused on the themes of phenomenology

and *Verstehen*. What then does the final part of the text offer? In the Introduction Jaspers makes a clear distinction between the first five parts and the final one. The former are devoted to clinical psychiatry, the final part to a philosophic reflection on what has preceded it. “In the sixth part we finally discuss *human life as a whole*. We are no longer making empirical observations but present a philosophical reflection. The final discussion, therefore, no longer adds to our knowledge but tries to clarify *our philosophical position*, into which we can gather all that we know and understand of Man” (p. 46). He adds at the beginning of Part Six: “It does not increase our knowledge but in it we reflect upon some fundamental philosophic questions. Such reflection seems important enough not to be omitted” (p. 747). First drafted almost thirty years after the first edition of the text, Part Six offers the mature philosopher’s reflection on the relations of philosophy and psychiatry. Of this reflection I will review some of the major points.

Jaspers begins by emphasizing the limitations of our ability to achieve complete knowledge of a human being. He addresses this point from a number of perspectives. Already at the very beginning of the Introduction to the entire text he distinguished clinical psychiatry from the study of psychopathology. The latter is interested in generalities, while the former is focused on the individual patient. But the science of psychopathology remains incomplete: “*Psychopathology is limited* in that there can be no final analysis of human beings as such, since the more we reduce them to what is typical and normative the more we realise there is something hidden in every human individual which defies recognition.” Later in the text Jaspers approached these limitations from the perspective of understanding of meaning, *Verstehen*. Understanding of meaning always involves interpretation, and when one interprets meaning, alternative interpretations are always possible. There is never a final, definitive interpretation (or understanding) of human behavior. He adds that, in addition to the intractable multiplicity of possible interpretations, understanding always comes up against two limits, Nature and Existence, i.e., on the one hand, the natural phenomena of drive, disposition, constitution, etc. that defy interpretation in the terms of meaningful connections, and on the other hand the phenomenon of human freedom.

Finally in the first section of Part Six he addresses this issue in the context of his mature philosophic position. He emphasizes that the notion of a complete

understanding of the human being is meaningless. “Nor can the demand [of complete knowledge] be satisfied by designing as it were some *construct of a human being* and showing how everything we know has its place somewhere within this construct or is part of it. There is no such construct of a human life. The human being is essentially incomplete and in himself he is inaccessible to knowledge...Rather in the end the human being himself remains an open question and so too our knowledge of him” (p. 748-9). Jaspers ties this point to his conviction that our knowledge—scientific and otherwise—is of objects, that we know the human being only as an object, and that because he is in the end more than an object, any total knowledge is impossible. What then is man beyond the objectivizing categories of scientific psychopathology? He (she) is Existence, a freedom that renders man—in Nietzsche’s words evoked by Jaspers—the ‘undefined animal’, essentially different from the rest of the animal kingdom. “Because the human potential is all-embracing a man’s nature cannot be defined. We cannot bring him under a single denominator as he does not conform to any one specialisation. We cannot subsume him under a general class as there is no other species like him” (p. 761). Jaspers associates man as Existence with other categories of his thought, namely man’s relation to Transcendence and to the Encompassing. Man is always something beyond himself.

What is the relevance of this line of thought to psychopathology? Jaspers places great emphasis on methodology, on the clarification of what any particular methodological approach can and cannot do. He sees it as a function of philosophy to clarify the methodological boundaries in the sciences dealing with human beings. Psychopathology as an empirical, scientific discipline is quite essential in treating psychiatrically ill people, but it overreaches itself if it claims a complete knowledge of the human being. As an objectivizing, empirical discipline, it will inevitably distort the nature of its object of study if it presumes a complete knowledge of the human person: “So far as the human being is empirically explorable as an object for knowledge he is unfree. But in so far as we ourselves experience, act and investigate we are free in our own self-certainty and hence more than we can ever discover. The patient, too, so far as he becomes an object for study is unfree but as himself he lives with a sense of freedom” (p. 758). Just as Jaspers chides scientific psychiatry for claiming more knowledge than it can achieve, he is equally critical of philosophically based psychotherapies that ignore the importance of the empirical

sciences and attempt to replace them with philosophical categories. "...if he [the psychiatrist] turns to the efforts of modern existential philosophy and uses *these iedas as a means of acquiring psychopathological knowledge*, making them an actual element of psychopathology itself, he is making a *scientific error*" (p. 776). In this regard he disputes the efforts of Binswanger and others to apply ontology directly to psychopathology, arguing that such efforts objectify ontology; and he criticizes Heidegger for offering the student "a total schema of human life as if it were knowledge" (p. 776)—a questionable critique, given that Heidegger also describes man as a 'question'.

In this discussion of methodology and the limits of a scientific knowledge of man Jaspers accords special attention to the *Verstehen* dimension of psychopathological knowledge. This dimension has a "double significance." On the one hand the understanding of meaningful connections contributes to empirical psychology, linking psychic events through connections of meaning. On the other hand this understanding is also our bridge to aspects of ourselves that are not objects of scientific knowledge but rather belong to our nature as Existence and Transcendence. "The thinking which illuminates Existence depends on the psychology of meaningful connections and is itself a stimulus to such a psychology. So, too, although the philosophy of Existence itself is not a field for psychology, every psychologist becomes in practice a philosopher illuminating Existence whether he knows it or not and whether he wants it or not" (p. 776).

In a section entitled "Psychiatry and Philosophy" Jaspers develops and summarizes the points described above. He argues that although most psychiatrists don't want to trouble themselves with philosophy, "philosophy is operative in every living science and ...without philosophy science is sterile and untrue and at best can only be correct" (p. 769). He reiterates that philosophy serves the dual methodological roles of clarifying the different approaches in empirical sciences (e.g. explanation versus understanding) and of pointing to the limits of all empirical disciplines (e.g. man as an object of science versus man as Existence). With respect to the latter he writes: "...it is only by being clear about the relationship between psychological understanding (as a means of empirical research) and philosophic illumination of Existence (as a means of appeal to freedom and transcendence) that a purely scientific psychopathology can come about which fills the entire canvas of its possibilities but does not transgress beyond

its limitations" (p. 769). Conversely, that dimension of human being which Jaspers points to with his terminology of freedom, existence, and transcendence, is only approachable through philosophical illumination and is quite unavailable through the methods of the empirical sciences.

The two final sections of Part Six are "The Concept of Health and Illness" and "The Meaning of Medical Practice." With respect to the former, Jaspers emphasizes the hazy boundaries separating health and illness, as well as the value-laden aspects of our notions of illness, especially in the case of psychiatric illness. With this latter point he is quite attuned to contemporary discussions of the value loading of the DSMs. He is skeptical of simple notions of health and illness and introduces a discussion of various definitions of health with the statement that "A precise definition of health seems pointless if we see the essence of Man as the incompleteness of his Being" (p. 787); and he questions a unitary notion of psychiatric illness, emphasizing the practicing psychiatrist's ease in dealing with a heterogeneity of conditions. "The psychiatrist sets little store on the general judgment of 'illness'. The heterogeneous realities which he observes are ordered into a number of concepts according to what is there. Once psychiatry began to designate personalities as 'sick' it became simply a practical matter where to draw the line in regard to all the individual variations" (p. 788). Jaspers also emphasizes the recursive quality of psychiatric illness, the fact that the patient's attitude toward his or her condition is an integral part of the condition itself. Finally, Jaspers comments on the general groupings of psychiatric disorders. His division of the somatically based from the non-somatically based may seem a little dated, but his concluding remark is not: "Human life as such is involved at every point [in the organically based illnesses], the concepts of the natural sciences are indispensable but here do not suffice and everywhere we find a gulf between man and beast" (p. 790).

In the last section of Part Six, "The Meaning of Medical Practice," Jaspers makes his final transition from the science of psychopathology to the treatment of the individual patient. He begins with comments on the limitations and contingencies of practice. He recognizes that practice always involves a theoretical position and that "therapeutic schools unwittingly foster the phenomena which they cure" (p. 791). He also recognizes that treatments take place in social

contexts and symbolic matrices, and that, in an age when the doctor has replaced the priest, we will have to replace the order of religious symbols with other symbolic forms. He argues forcefully against the idea of a value and belief-free psychotherapy: "*Sharing in something objective*—whether symbols, a faith, the accepted philosophy of some group—is a necessary condition for any profound cohesion among men. Many modern psychotherapists labour under the illusion that, when faced with neuroses and personality disorders, the highest possible expectation is realisation of the patient's own self, development of his powers of synthetic reasoning and a balanced human fulfilment in terms of his own personal pattern. Psychotherapy must be set within a frame of common beliefs and values. If not, the individual is thrown back to an extreme degree on his own resources, and even if he can respond only minimally to this, psychotherapy becomes nothing else than superfluous; if, however, in a total atmosphere of disbelief, the individual cannot respond at all, psychotherapy may only too easily become a smoke-screen for failure" (p. 792-3). In this regard he argues that science provides the methods but not the aims of psychotherapy. "Things are expected from science which it can never provide. In this age of superstitious belief in science, science is used to conceal unanswerable facts" (p. 793).

Jaspers devotes much of the section to a discussion of the different levels of therapeutic relationship. He begins with the example of the surgeon removing a tumor—medical treatment at its most technical, the physician as technician. He describes levels of engagement based on authority and detachment and ends finally with existential communication: "Therefore, what is left as the ultimate thing in the doctor-patient relationship is *existential communication*, which goes far beyond any therapy, that is, beyond anything that can be planned or methodologically staged. The whole treatment is thus absorbed and defined within a community of two selves who live out the possibilities of Existence, as reasonable beings...The doctor is not a pure technician nor pure authority, but Existence itself for its own sake, a transient human creature like his patient. There is no final solution" (p. 798-9).

The reader of the above quotation may feel that Jaspers the philosopher is overreaching in his goals for therapeutic engagement and stating an expectation for therapy that is rarely achieved even in non-therapeutic relationships. I share such a feeling but would add in Jaspers' defense that I have indicated only the two extreme poles of therapeutic engagement, technical

intervention and existential communication, and that Jaspers spells out the several intermediate stages—which we would recognize in our own work, and which space does not permit me to detail. The power of his presentation is in using his philosophic wisdom to frame the goals and limits of psychiatric treatment. With respect to psychiatric knowledge, I have already indicated the absolute necessity of a scientific psychopathology as well as the recognition of the limits of that in human freedom. With respect to treatment, Jaspers is fully aware that, while existential communication stands as a goal that explodes the boundaries of conventional treatment, the latter is both necessary and adequate (and all that is realistic) in most psychiatric treatment.

Jaspers ends the final section of the final part of *General Psychopathology* with remarks on the psychiatrist him- or herself. Predictably, just as he is intolerant of our narrow, pseudoscientific reduction of the patient to a biological organism to be subjected to technical, psychiatric interventions, so also is he intolerant of our efforts of self-definition as simply psychiatric scientists. Of the 'ideal' psychotherapist he writes that "Science is only a part of his necessary equipment.

Much more has to be added. It is likely that psychotherapy will only reach any standing if the practitioner returns to the profounder sources of human knowledge, in addition to studying the psychotherapists of the last fifty years, who when all is said and done have confined themselves to the neuroses and are, philosophically speaking, of a lowly order. A human image wants to be gained from an anthropology nurtured on Greek philosophy, on Augustine and Kierkegaard, Kant, Hegel and Nietzsche" (p. 809-821). I hasten to add that Jaspers is not endorsing the kind of clinically impoverished "philosophical counseling" described by Jerry Kroll in his president's column but rather is arguing for an ideal mixture of clinical, scientific knowledge *and* the kind of human, philosophical wisdom that is not to be found in psychiatric textbooks.

In filling out his portrait of the ideal psychiatrist Jaspers includes a demand for self-illumination on the part of the practitioner who claims an expertise in the self-illumination of others. Interestingly, he remarks that training analysis is one route to such self-illumination but by no means the only one, and that, when carried out in an

atmosphere of a required exercise, it may not even be an adequate one.

So what do we make of Part VI? Should we fall back on the trustworthy contributions of *Verstehen* and phenomenology and not pay too great heed to the reflections of Part VI? Are they but the excesses of the philosopher who has long since severed his ties with the clinic and is quite out of touch with psychiatry as a branch of bio-medicine? Certainly many in our field (including, perhaps, many of my readers) would share such a view, and even, in the current state of our field, find Part VI a bit of an embarrassment. It should be obvious that I don't share this judgment and rather find in Part VI a powerful and provocative response to the excesses of contemporary, bio-medically oriented psychiatry. In 1989 Samuel Guze wrote a classic article entitled "Biological psychiatry: Is there any other kind?" Jaspers would respond that the question is poorly phrased. Of course psychiatry is biological, but so much more.

James Phillips, M.D.

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
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